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The twz,  major arguments  for fertility  reduction  involve  exter-
nalities  and income  redistribution.  The implications  of the two
arguments  for policy are the same  - both require behavioral
change  by  the poor.  Their  behavior  is most  likely  to change  if the
change  improves  their welfare  - which  should  therefore  be the
focus of population  programs.
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Copies  of the paper  are available  free  from the World  Bank, 1818  H Street  NW, Washington,  DC 20433.
Please  contact  Ella Homsby,  room J1O-206,  extension  35742  (July 1993,  26 pages).
Birdsall  and Griffin review  the implications  fo.  Where  there are true externalities,  the rich
social  policy in developing  countries  of two  may also end up as well or better off in terms of
majorjustifications  for fertility  reduction:  the  income  than they were, because  everyone  can
extemality  argument  and the income  redistribu-  benefit  from the overall  efficiency  gain.
tion argument.
Where  there are not true extemalities,  the
First they set out the arguments.  In terms  of  poor are made better off in the sense of real
how  policy affects the poor, they show that the  income  while  the rich gain in terms  of utility  by
implications  of the two different arguments  are  financing  the necessary  social  programs.
virtually  id ntical.  Both imply  that the only
reasonable  way to view policies  to reduce  Birdsall  and Griffin outline  briefly the
fertility  is as activities  in which one segment  of  program  implications  of this "welfare"  approach:
society  (the rich) is offering  another  segment  (the  more  emphasis  on a package  of targeted  social
poor) compensation  to elicit a change  in behav-  programs,  and more emphasis  in family planning
ior.  services  on client welfare  and contraceptive
choice.
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Rapid  population  growth  in  developing  countries  is the  basis  of
one or more of a number  of concerns,  both in the  popular  and in the
scholarly  literatures. Some of these  concerns  are:
o  that  rapid  population  growth  reduces  the  rate  of economic
growth  by, for  example,  reducing  investment  in huwani  and
physical  capital;  I/
o  that  rapid  population  growth  has negative  externalities,  ai
leading  in some  scenarios  to  degradation  of natural  resources
at the  national  level  or contributing  to such  environmental
problems  as global  warming;
o  that  rapid  population  growth  has  negative  "pecuniary"
externalities,  i.e.,  that  it reduces  the  incomes  of some
groups,  particularly  the  poor,  compared  to other  groups  and
therefore  exacerbates  the  problem  of poverty  in  developing
countries.
The first  concern  has  been  amply  explored  for  at least  two
decades;  its  merits  are  difficult  to  address  empirically. In the  absence
of compelling  evidence  it remains  a matter  of controvezsy.  2/
1/  The classic  presentation  of the  argument  is that  of Coale  and  Hoover
(1958). See  Birdsall  (1988)  for  a review  of the literature  on the
economic  consequences  of rapid  population  growth  in developing
countries.
2/  Some argue  that  population  growth  may have  positive  externalities.
While  we do not dismiss  that  possibility,  in this  paper  we are
concerned  with the  implications  of possible  negative  externalities.
3/  In addition  to the  citations  in  footnote  1, see  Kelley  (1988),  World
Bank (1984),  National  Research  Council (1986),  which in turn  cite
hundreds  of earlier  studies  and  reviews.
1Economists  have recently  noted,  in  any  event,  that  in the  absence  of
externalities,  a negative  effect  of rapid  population  growth  on economic
growth  need  not in itself  be of great  concern. Parents  may fully  realize
that  childran  are costly  to them (and  to society),  and  yet  prefer  to have
more children  rather  than  higher  consumption  of other  costly  things.  A/
If 3o, rapid  population  growth  may  be socially  optimal  even if it impedes
economic  growth. There  are some  countervailing  arguments,  however. Recent
new approaches  to growth  theory  emphasize  the  possibility  that investments
in human  resources  may  be a more important  contributor  to growth  than
heretofore  believed  and that  there  may  be positive  externalities  associated
witi such investments. To the  extent  that  rapid  population  growth  inhibits
such investments,  its  effects  on growth  may not  be socially  optimal.  5/
In any  event,  in this  paper  we do not  consider  further  this
first  concern. Instead  we concentrate  on the  policy  implications  of the
two  other  concerns:  negative  externalities  of rapid  population  grcwth  and
effects  on income  distribution  (and  thus  on poverty).  6/  We are
concerned  in  particular  with the  implications  for the  poor of the  various
approaches  to  population  policy  that  arise  from  these  two  concerns. In
Section  II we set  out  briefly  the  two  concerns,  using simple  graphs  to
4/  Lee (1991)  sets  out this  point  clearly. He notes that  Demeny,  in
1972,  pointed  out that  to  decry  such  a decision  on parents'  part
would  be like  decrying  people's  decision  not to  work on Sundays  on
the  grounds  that  it reduces  their  incomes.
5./  See  Romer (1986)  and  Azariadis  and  Drazen (1990)  on sources  of growth
including  such  externalities  to  human  resource  investments.
6/  Some  readers  may find  the  distinction  between  the  negative
externality  argument  and  the  income  distribution  argument,  as each  is
characterized  in this  paper,  somewhat  artificial,  since  both concerns
point  to the  need to improve  social  welfare  through  popalation
programs. But the  authors  believe  it is  useful  to understand  the
differing  motivation  and  meaning  of the two  arguments  as well as the
fact  that they  lead to the  same  end.
2illustrate  how  each can  be translated  into  a rationale  for some  sort of
population  policy. We note  that  in terms  of  policy  as it affects  the  poor,
the  implications  of the  two  different  approaches  are  virtually  identical.
In Section  III  we discuss  the  implications  of these  two  concerns  for the
structure  and content  of programs  to reduce  fertility  --  in this context  we
review  education,  health  and family  planning  programs;  effects  of family
planning  on women's  welfare;  expansion  of contraceptive  choice;  and the  use
of incentives  to reduce  fertility. We conclude  with  an assessment  of the
importance  to the  future  success  of fertility  reduction  efforts  of taking  a
fundameiLtally  redistributive  approach  to population  policy, --  an approach
in which  one  segment  of society  (the  relatively  rich)  offers  another
segment (the  relatively  poor)  additional  resources  --  irr:spective  of the
specific  rationale  for  the  policy.
Section  II.  The  Externalitv  and Income  Distribution  AvDroaghes
Neqative  Environmental  Externalities
Negative  externalities  to childbearing  arise  if there  is a
divergence  between  the  private  and social  costs  of children,  i.e.,  if one
couple's  childbearing  decisions  imposes  costs  on other  families.  Z/  In
a recent  paper  Lee (1991)  sets  out  a framework  for  considering  empirically
such  externalities. He concludes  (with  great  caution  --  he notes that the
numbers  are rough  and the  exercise  is experimental)  that  externalities  are
not so great  nor  always  in the  expected  direction  --  they are  not always
negative  for  developing  countries. However,  as Lee  himself  points  out, he
does not include  any  estimate  to account  for  externalities  arising from
7/  In the  World  Bank's  1984  World  Development  Report,  this  divergence
between  private  and social  costs  provided  an important  justification
for  government  programs  to reduce  fertility.
3renewable  common  property  resources  (what  we will  refer  crudely  to  as
environmental  externalities).  I/  In  addition,  since  he undertakes  the
anal:i  is using  countries  as the  unit  of analysiz,  he is unable  to take  into
account  environmental  externalities  arising  at the  global  level.
Yet  negative  environmental  externalities,  at the  global  and
national  level,  are increasingly  alluded  to  as a rationale  for  efforts  to
reduce  population  growth  in developing  countries. Though  on a per capita
basis,  the  fossil  fuel  emissions  that  currently  contribute  to  possible
global  warming  are  much greater  in industrialized  countries,  rates  of
increase  in income  and in  population  are likely  to  be greater  in developing
countries,  implying  that  the  contribution  of these  countries  to global
emissions  could  rise from  about  20%  today  to 50%  by the  middle  of the  next
century. At the  national  level,  the  combination  of poverty  and rapid
population  growth  is often  cited  as contributing  to environmental
degradation,  for  example  bscause  population  pressure  leads  to farming  of
hillsides  and other  marginal  areas (causing  soil  erosion)  or heavy  cutting
of forests  for  fuel (causing  damage  to  watersheds,  hence  to agriculture,
and contributing  to  possibly  irreversible  reductions  in  biodiversity).
Figure  1 illustrates  how these  externalities  (and  we are
assuming  their  existence  at this  point)  can  justify  a policy  to reduce
fertility  and thus  population  growth. The figure  shows  a production
possibilities  frontier  in  a two-good  world  that  produces  environmental
services  and food.  Greater  food  production  comes  at a cost to the
environment  in this  simple  world,  at an increasing  rate  as environmental
8/  Lee  also assum#-  !hat  the  population  is  homogeneous,  i.e.,  that  all
members  have t..e  e'-  constraints  and  preferences  (thus  not taking
into  account,  for  .. _ple, the  possibility  that  differences  in the
tax  burden  and the  incidence  of public  expenditures  imply  transfers
from  one  portion  of the  population  to  another).
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justified  because  a  Figure I  Illustration  of  Externality
Argument
developing  country  is
somewnere  inside  the frontier,  such  as at  point  M, and it is inside  the
frontier  because  parents (especially  poor  parents,  an issue  we explore
further  below)  are  having  more -hildren  than  is optimal  for  the  country  as
a whole.  In this  example,  parents  are  not taking  into account  the  economic
costs  to their  country  associated  with  high fertility,  population  pressure
and  resulting  environmental  degradation.  9/
If such  a country  could,  through  a  population  program,  induce
parents  to have fewer  children,  then  that  country  could  move out to  a point
such  as N on the  production  possibilities  frontier. With smaller  families,
9/  There  may be other  reasons  why  poor  parents  are  having  "too  many"
children. Some of these  we discuss  below. Here we are  concentrating
on the simple  example  of a negative  environmental  externality.
5output  lo/  would  rise and  the  country  as a whole  would  be better  off.
Analogously,  if we consider  a global  society,  .Z  industrialized  countries
could  induce  developing  countries  to reduce  their  fertility  levels,  then
global  welfare  could  increase.
The question  is then  how to induce  people  to have fewer
children. We are  assuming  (for  the  moment)  _hat  people  are  having  the
number  of children  they  wish;  there  is  no excess  or unwanted  fertility,
even  among  the  poor.  With the  population  problem  rooted  solely  in these
so-called  environmental  externalities,  inducing  lower  fertility  requires
that  the  external  _.osts  of children  be somehow  imposed  on parents (reducing
their  demand  for  children),  or, to  put it  another  way, that  the  constraints
parents  face  be somehow  altered  in a  manner  that  raises  the  cost  of
children  to them.
There  are several  ways to  do this. A tax  on children  11/
would  reduce  the  demand  for  children,  and  a tax-financed  incentive  for  not
bearing  more children  would  have  the  same  effect. Although  taxes  or cash
incentives  to reduce  fertility  have been  used in some  countries (Singapore
and  Bangladesh,  for  examp'Je  12/),  they  are  politically  unpalatable  in
many countries.  13/  Moreover,  incentives  designed  to correct  for
io/  In this example,  it is probably  more  accurate  to say the  present
discounted  value  of long-run  output  will increase. Short-run  output
could  decrease  while  environmental  problems  are  addressed.
11/  I.e.  a Pigovian  tax  to address  the  specific  source  of externality-
inducing  behavior.
12/  Payments  in Bangladesh,  h6wever,  are  provided  only for  permanent
methods  and are  very low,  designed  to  compensate  for  tha time  and
discomfort  of the  procedure  itself.
13/  Subsidies  or positive  incentives  to  encourage  high fertility  are  more
common,  having  been  used in France  and  parts  of eastern  Europe,  and
are  obviously  a form  of incentive  that  is politically  acceptable.
6negative  externalities,  which  could  in  principle  be structured  to be less
regressive  than  taxes,  raiss  other  problems,  such  as entrapment.  14/
More often  discussed  are other  interventions  which,  in the
presence  of negative  externalities,  governments  rmay  use  to alter
individuals'  fertility  behavior,  and  particularly  fertility  behavior  of the
poor who tend  to have  more children,  especially  in developing  countries,
than  the  nonpoor. Successful  interventions  tend  to involve  changes  for  the
Ihetter  in the  situation  of the  poor:  expanded  opportunities  for  women,
better  health  for  their  children,  ready  access  to family  planning,
educacion  programs  that  attract  children  into  school  and  keep  them there,
and programs  that  help  parents  substitute  for  the  income-earning
capabilities  of children,  reducing  the  value  of children  as a source  of
immediate  income  and old-age zecurity.  These  changes  in the  parents'
situation  affect  demand  for children  by raising  the  "price"  of children  to
parents.  15/  All such  programs  are essentially  investments  in the
human capital  of mothers  and  children,  or poverty  alleviation  activities.
14/  Entrapment  occurs  if an individual  is induced,  for  example  due to
myopia  or desperate  poverty,  to take  an irreversible  step  he or she
later  regrets. It has  been  discussed  in the  context  of cash  payments
to persons  who are  sterilized. See  Chomitz  and  Birdsall,  1991,  where
the  justification  for  and  welfare  implications  of incentives  to
reduce  fertility,  as well  as of child  taxes  and  child  quotas,  are
discussed. They conclude  that incentives  to correct  for  failures  in
the  market  for  information  about  contraception  have  potential  in many
developing  countries,  but that  incentives  to correct  for
externalities  are harder  to justify,  would  probably  involve  larger
financial  amounts,  and  raise  a number  of difficult  ethical  issues.
15/  For  discussion  of these  policies  as interventions  to reduce
fertility,  see  World  Bank (1984). It may  be counter-intuitive  but is
easily  demonstrated  that  interventions  that  would  improve  the lives
of people,  such  as education  and  lower  mortality,  will increase  the
"price"  of the  quantity  of children  by raising  the  cost  of ir.puts
required  to rear  children,  such  as the  opportunity  cost  of parents'
time;  see  Becker  and  Lewis (1974).
7These  programs  tend  to have the  same  effect  as taxes  on
children,  but they  work indirectly  and  have the  desirable  characteristic  of
succeeding  by raising  the  "quality"  of children. They  do need to be
f-.lanced,  presumably  through  taxes. The rich,  who  would  presumably  bear
the tax  burden  of these  programs,  are likely  to  do so  because  they can  also
gain income  --  as the  lower  average  fertility  permits  the  society  to move
from  point  M in figure  1 to the  frontier,  generating  additional  output.
The fundamental  poii.t,  to which  we will return,  is that  a
change  in the  fertility  behavior  of the  poor requires  a change  in their
situation,  i.e.,  a change  in the  relative  prices  they  face. The poor will
voluntarily  choose  fewer  children  only if the  change  in their  situation
makes them  at least  as well off  as they  are currently.  16/  Any other
approach  would  have to include  an element  of compulsion;  otherwise  the  poor
have no reason  to alter  their  fertility  behavior  (and  to  help society  to
move away  from the  suboptimal  point  M in figure  1.)
Similarly,  a change  in the  fertility  behavior  of poor countries
is unlikely  unless  there  is a change  in the  circumstances  that  induce  high
fertility  in those  countries. Thus it may  be in the  interests  of the
citizens  of rich countries  to "purchase"  lower  fertility  in  poor countries
by financing  changes  such  as more  educational  opportunities  in  poor
countries. To the  extent  that  these  changes  move the  global  society  from
point  M to  point  N, all countries  can  be better  off. 17/
6/  Note that  the  determination  of  welfare  is  what the  poor think  makes
them  better  off,  not  what  others  believe  should  make them  better  off.
A compulsory  population  program  that is imposed  on the  poor and that
provides  no compensation  to them  applies  a low  weight  to their
perception  of what  makes them  better  off.
17/  It should  be noted  that  figure  1 contains  no information  about  the
distribution  of output  gains  between  rich  and  poor if  a society (or
the  world)  succeeds  in  moving  from  M to N.
8Xncome Distribution  and  Poverty
In  this  section  we  assume  away  the  pure  externalities  referred
to  above  and  consider  only  the  problem  of  "pecuniary"  externalities,  i.e.,
the  negative  effect  of  rapid  population  growth  on  income  equality  and  thus
on  the  poor.  Rapid  population  growth  can  worsen  the  distribution  of  income
in  developing  countries  and  it  probably  exacerbates  the  problems  of  the
poor.  At  the  aggregate  level,  rapid  growth  of  population  increases  che
availability  of  labor  in  an  economy  relative  to  land  and  physical  capital,
reducing  wages.  18/  This  is likely  to  worsen  inequality  and  hurt  the
poor,  who  are  more  reliant  on  labor  income.  Moreover,  there  is evidence
that  unskilled,  but  not  skilled  laborers,  suffer  a  relative  decline  in
wages  if  they  are  members  of a  large  cohort.  19/
At  the  family  level,  poverty  and  high  fertility  seem  to  form  a
vicious  circle.  As  we  point  out  in  an  earlier  paper  20/,  high
fertility  contributes  to  poverty.  It  strains  the  budgets  of  poor  families,
reducing  available  resources  to  feed,  educate  and  provide  health  care  to
children.  With  households  classified  by  per  capita  income  in  Brazil,
Colombia,  Malaysia  and  rural  India  (data  from  the  1970s),  the  ratio  of
income  per  child  in  the  richest  households  to  that  in  the  poorest  ranges
from  about  12  in  ruirc  India  to  more  than  loo  in  Brazil.  L/  A  study
of  families  with  twins  in  India  found  that  the  additional  unexpected  child
18/  Note  that  although  wages  are  depressed  in  tais  scenario,  rents  and
profits  are  boosted.  High  fertility  is therefore  potentially  Pareto
superior  to  low  fertility,  assuming  that  there  were  a  mechanism  for
redistribution  of  some  of  the  rents  of  landlords  and  capitalists  (Ng,
1986;  Willis,  1987)..
19/  Behrman  and  Birdsall,  1988,  show  this  for  males  in  Brazil.
20/  Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988.
21L/  Birdsall,  1988;  or  Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988.represented  by  twins  reduced  enrollment  levels  of  all  children  in  the
household.  22/  Estimates  based  on  Malaysian  data  show  that  couples
with  a  higher  biological  propensity  to  have  births  (higher  fecundity  or
supply  of  births)  are  also  characterized  by  lower  schooling  attainment  for
their  children.  23/
At  the  same  time,  a  massive  literature  has  shown  repeatedly
that  many  characteristics  of  poor  households  contribute  to  high
fertility  --  high  infant  mortality,  lack  of  education  for  women,  too  little
family  income  to  "invest"  in  children,  and  inaccessibility  of  family
planning  services.  24/
How can  it  be  that  poor  parents  persist  in  having  many  children
if  it  tends  to  exacerbate  their  problems?  For  simplicity  the  answer  can  be
divided  into  two  categories.
Unwanted  Fertility.  First  is  the  simplest  explanation:  that
some  fertility  of  the  poor  is  unwanted.  In  many  countries  there  are
significant  proportions  of  women who  say  that  they  would  like  to  limit
their  fertility,  yet  do  not  do  so.  This  condition  of  "unmet  need"  (as
defined  and  measured  by  demographers)  characterizes  a  quarter  of  married
fecund  women  in  Bangladesh,  one-fifth  in  Nepal,  one-eighth  in
Egypt.  25/  However,  the  phenornenon  of  "unmet  need"  does  not  imply  that
22/  Rosenzweig  and  Wolpin,  1980.
23/  Rosenzweig  and  Schultz,  1987.
24/  Studies  on  the  determinants  of  fertility  are  reviewed  in  Birdsall,
1988.  See  also  World  Bank,  1984.  Birdsall  and  Griffin,  1988,  review
the  evidence  that  reduced  fertility,  including  among  the  poor,  is
associated  with  lower  infant  mortality,  more  educated  mothers,  better
educational  opportunities  for  children,  and  better  access  to  family
planning  services.
25/  Boulier,  1985.
10parents  are  acting  irrationally. Chomitz  and  Birdsall  (1991)  set out  a
number  of  market  failures,  including  of credit,  insurance  and information
markets,  that  explain  why individuals  may fail  to  use contraception  even
when they  want  no more children;  these  are  all  possible  barriers  to the
optimal  use  of contraception  from  an individual's  or couple's  point of
view.  In fact,  demographers  use the  term  "unmet  need"  to signify  would-be
demand  for  contraception  were the  price  of contraception  zero (including
psychic  as well as monetary  costs). Yet  the  price  of contraception  is
never,  of course,  zero.  The  credit,  information  and other  constraints  that
keep the  price  well above  zero tend  to  affect  the  poor  more than the  rich,
and the  direct  costs  of contraception  for the  poor  represent  a larger
fraction  of total  resources,  both  human  and financial,  available  to them.
The implication  for  population  policy  of the  existence  of
unwanted fertility is obvious --  subsidized family planning services
targeted  to the  poor.  As was the  case  above,  when  we  were assuming  that
negative  externalities  exist,  so-called  unwanted  fertility  is likely  to
persist  unless  there  are changes  in the  situation  the  poor endure --  indeed
not only  better  access  to family  planning  but improvements  in their  access
to capital,  to information,  and  to complementary  services  such  as health
and  education. In short,  even  assuming  there  is "unmet  need,"  it is still
the  case that  a change  in the  fertility  behavior  of the  poor requires  a
change  in their  circumstances  --  including  at the  least  better  access  to
family  planning  services.  26/
26/  Family  planning  services,  if of reasonable  quality,  have certainly
contributed  to lower  fertility,  though  they  are  most effective  in
settings  where women  are  reasonably  well  educated. In  Bangladesh,
where  women's  education  is low,  contraceptive  use  rose from 14 to 31
percent  in the 1980s,  and the  total  fertility  rate  fell from 6.3 to
4.6.  (Ahmed  1987; Griffin  1989)
11Endoaenous  Altruism  and the  Welfare  of Children. Our second
explanation  for the  high fertility  of the  poor is  based  on the  possibility
of a distinction  between  the  welfare  of  parents  and the  welfare  of
children. Above  we noted,  in a different  context,  that  parents  may
reasonably  trade  off  higher  consumption  of other  costly  things  in favor  of
more children. Consequently,  even  if high  fertility  impedes  economic
growth  it  may still  be socially  optimal  in that  lower  fertility  would
reduce  the  utility  of parents. But  what if this  tradeoff  is chosen  by poor
parents  without  full  information  about  the  costs  of this high fertility  for
their  children? Suppose  parents  trade  off  more  children  against  more
education  per child --  unaware  that  the  returns  to education  are  rising?
Suppose  parents "choose"  additional  pregnancies  because  they fear that  some
of their  current  children  will die --  unaware  that  child  mortality  is
rapidly  falling?
Or suppose  that  parents'  degree  of  altruism  toward  their
children  is in fact  endogenous,  e.g. that  altruism  toward  children  is
itself  a positive  function  of income  --  a luxury  only  the relatively  well
off can  afford?  27/  Parents,  in their  own  desperate  poverty,  may
choose  more children  because  children  seem  critical  to their  own
survival  --  in the  process  trading  off some  small  measure  of additional
welfare  for  those  children  they  already  have.  This  decision  would  seem
27/  Nerlove  et al. (1987)  show  that if  parents  do not care  about their
children,  an intergenerational  externality  will  not exist.  However,
in the  more likely  case  that  parents  do care  about their  children,  an
intergenerational  externality  can  arise  because  their  altruism  drives
a  wedge  between  the  private  and  social  costs  of additional  children.
Altruism  by parents (or  carinig  about  their  progeny)  enters  through
the  utility  function  and is consequently  subject  to the  usual
concavity  restrictions. People  with  higher  incomes  can  afford  to be
more  altruistic  because  the  amount  of altruism  "purchased"  is
dependent  on income,  just  as purchases  of  other  goods  would  be.
12likely,  even  necessary,  in the  case  of  parents  with three  or four  daughters
in a society  where  only  a son  can  provide  reasonable  security  in old
age. 28/  In short,  though  high fertility  of the  poor  worsens  the
situation  of society  (the  global  environmental  externality)  and  even the
situation  of poor families  as a group (the  pecuniary  externality,  i.e.,
that the  wages  of unskilled  labor  fall),  each individual  poor couple  might
well be better  off  with  many children--who  can  earn more than  they  consume
and  provide some  security  in  old  age --  even  though  the  children  themselves
are  not better  off.
Figure  2 illustrates  the  case in  which the  problem  of
externalities  does  not  arise. The figure  shows  the  distribution  of welfare
in a two-person  society,  in  which  in the  absence  of externalities,  the
society  is on its  production  frontier  (such  as at point  N in figure  1).  We
are treating  the  two  people  as composite  populations  of the  rich  and the
poor.  The rich  are assumed  to  prefer  smaller  families  (including  smaller
families  for  the  poor),  and the  poor are  assumed  to prefer  larger  families.
The two  utility  possibilities  frontiers  (UPF 1 and UPF 2) correspond  to two
different  policy  regimes,  e.g.,  UPF 1, with  no social  programs  for  the  poor,
favoring  utility  of the  rich,  versus  UPF 2, with social  programs  for the
28/  A second  type  of argument,  based  on the  quantity-quality  tradeoff,
leads  to the  same  conclusion. Higher  quality (healthier,  better
educated)  children  may  be valued  by parents,  but they  are  costly.  In
developing  countries,  children  enter  the  budget  constraint  on both
the  expenditure  and  the  income  sides  because  they  can  add to family
income. At low  levels  of family  income  it is possible  that,  even
though  the  quality  of children  is  an important  consideration,
families  are so constrain6d  by their  low  income  that  short  term
survival  leads  to  more  weight  being  placed  on children's  incomes,
however  low, than  on spending  for  child  quality. Thus,  just because
parents  care  about  their  children  the  result  may not  be behavior  that
is entirely  in the long  term  interests  of the  children. Poor parents
must make difficult  choices  as they  juggle  a number  of contradictory
objectives.
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distribution  of goods
is shown  by point  X,,  corresponding  to UE  utility  for  the  poor  and UR  for
the rich (presumably  the  rich  are  a much smaller  group). Suppose  a social
program,  e.g.  education  or family  planning,  is proposed  that  will reduce
the number  of children  born to the  poor while  maintaining  them  at no less
than the same  utility  level  they  achieve  now,  with their (currently)  larger
families.  The social  program  is financed  by taxing  the  rich.  29/
Such a reallocation  corresponds  to  UPF 2, where  the rich  are  willing  to
finance  the  new  program,  requiring  society  to  produce  a bundle  of goods
2a/  We are  assuming  here that  the  burden  of taxes  is borne  by the  rich.
This is  more obvious  if  we consider  transfers  via international  aid
programs  as taxes  on the  rich  countries.
14that reduces the notential  maximum utility of the rich and increases the
DotentLal  maximum utility of the poor. 30/
Suppose  that the  social  program  moves  society  from  Xl  to  X2.
Both  the rich and the  poor would  enjoy  an unambiguous  increase  in  actual
welfare (from  UP  to Ul  for  the  poor  and  from  UR  to UR  for the  rich). The
rich  secure  higher  utility  for  themselves,  given  they  prefer  smaller
families  among the  poor,  by financing  the  social  programs  through
taxes.  31/
P.ll  this  approach  tells  us is that  in the  absence  of true
externalities,  noncoercive  programs  that  reduce  fertility  are,
30/  We make a distinction  between  potential  and  actual  utility. The
maximum  potential  utility  of the  rich  drops  as we move from  UPF 1 to
UPF 2, which is seen  by the  drop  in the  y-intercept. The  converse  is
true for the  poor,  as seen  in the  increase  of the  x-intercept  between
the two  regimes. The  reason  is that  society,  through  the  social
programs  we have  posited,  has chosen  to give  up some  goods  that  the
rich would  enjoy  consuming  in order  to  provide  basic services  needed
by the  poor.  Actual  utillty  is shown  by the  X's in the  graph. The
rich give up potential  utility  because  doing  so increases  their
actual  utility,  from  X1 to  X 2 (or  X3 ).  Actual  utility  increases
because,  in this  example,  the  poor  have fewer  children  as a result  of
the  social  programs,  which  is  valued  by the  rich.  It is  almost
incidental  that  a noncoercive  approach  to social  policy  means  that
society  must  move  northeast  from  X 1, a region  where  both the  rich  and
the  poor are  at least  as well  off  as before  the  program  is
instituted.
331/  E.g. taxpayers  in industrialized  countries  finance  programs  in  Africa
or South  Africa  to reduce  fertility,  through  bilateral  aid.
isfundamentally,  income  redistribution  programs.  2aI  In practice,  this
is the  same result  one  would  get  under  the  externality  argument  as
presented  in the  previous  section  if  noncoercive  policies  are followed
under that  alternative  justification.
Section IM.  From Theorv to Practice
Whether  the  fundamental  problem  is  one  of externalities,
prevalence  of unwanted  fertility  among  the  poor,  or endogenous  altruism,
the  implication  is the  same.  An interest  in  reducing  population  growth
requires  that  policies  be designed  to  keep  the  poor at least  as well off  as
they  are  now, but  with fewer  children. This  "welfare"  approach,  i.e.
emphasizing  the  need to at least  maintain  the  current  welfare  of the  poor
if fertility  is to fall,  puts three  issues  into  perspective:
o  If there  is  a divergence  between  where  the  world is in terms  of
population  growth  and  where  it  would  like to be,  noncoercive
policies  can  move  us closer  to the  optimum.
32/  Note also that society  may  care  about  income  distribution  and  poverty
per se,  and prefer  a more to a less  equal  distribution  and less
poverty  to more  poverty. If this  is so,  it strengthens  the  argument
for  fertility  reduction  programs  defined  in the  broad  sense  that  we
have used.  Reducing  the  fertility  of the  poor as a means to reduce
poverty  may be preferable  to direct  income  transfers,  and it  may  be
less  likely  to introduce  perverse  incentives  (e.g.,  for  labor
supply). However,  the  argument  that  the  maximum  point  of social
welfare  depends  on equity  as well  as efficiency  is a problematic  one.
There is  no consensus  that  a social  welfare  function  could  be
identified  for  a specific  society,  what  information  it  would  convey
to us in a practical  sense,  whether  it is  possible  to aggregate
individual  preferences  regarding  equity  to arrive  at any consensus
about income  distribution,  and  what  types  of interpersonal
comparisons  of welfare  could  be defended  and  acted  upon through
public  policy.  Of course,  despite  these  reservations,  income
distribution  decisions  lie  at the  base  of most public  policy
decisions,  which  are  made  all  of the  time.
16o  A population  policy  will have  a short-run  cost to someone; (if
there  are externalities,  the  long-run  benefits  will outweigh
the  costs). One option  that  is consistent  with the externality
approach  in figure  1 is to implicitly  or explicitly  tax
children. But child  taxes  would  be regressive  and difficult  to
collect  from  the  poor.  The  alternative  is to introduce
programs  and  policies  that  will improve  the  situation  of the
poor.  The rich  are likely  to pay  through  taxes  for these
programs.
O  Even  if there  is difficulty  justifying  nopulation  programs  on
the  basis  of negative  externalities  to rapid  population  growth,
that  does not  mean that  the  programs  cannot  be justified.
There  may be redistributive  social  programs  that  will improve
welfare  overall;  the  rich  are  willing  to  finance  these  programs
because  they  benefit  in a  welfare  sense  from  the  effect  of the
programs  on the  fertility  of the  poor (figure  2).
In short,  in an extension  of the ideas  and  literature  discussed
in an earlier  article (Birdsall  and Griffin  1988),  we believe  valid
arguments  can  be made from  either  the  externality  or the  income
distribution  approach  for  programs  whose  fundamental  purpose  is to reduce
fertility  by improving  the  lives  of the  poor.
What are the  implications  of this  view for  the  structure  and
content  of programs  to reduce  fertility?
Incentives  and Fertility  Reduction  33/
Cash-based  tax  or subsidy  programs  would  be an economist's
first  choice  in solving  the  problem  under  either  scenario. It should  be
33/  See  Chomitz  and  Birdsall  (1991)  for  a formal  discussion.
17clear  that  taxes  on children  or cash incentives  for  not  having  children  are
a mechanism  by which  society  assures  that  any  negative  externality
associated  with high fertility  (figure  1) is internalized  by parents.  It
should  also  be clear  that  a program  that  uses cash  or  near-cash
compensation  --  something like direct cash, a retirement annuity, a
guaranteed  opportunity  of college  for two  or three  children,  or health
insurance  --  to  maintain  the  poor  parents'  welfare,  is  consistent  with the
compensation  principle  implicit  in figure  2.
However,  such  subsidies  or compensation  are  more typically  tied
to specific  goods  and services,  such  as social  services,  be,ause  cash
payments  to reduce  fertility  are  often  impractical  and  in  most societies
are  difficult  to design  in a  manner  that  is ethically  acceptable. As a
consequence,  we do not  pursue  the  cash  payment  approach  any further  and
consider  only redistribution  through  social  programs.
Taraeted  Social  Proarrams
There  is a large  body of evidence  summarized  in  Birdsall  and
Griffin (1988)  that  high  infant  mortality,  lack  of education  for  mothers,
low educational  opportunities  for  children,  and  poor  access  to family
planning  services,  all contribute  to  high fertility,  both directly  and
indirectly.
When  high infant  mortality  rates  fall,  they  afford  mothers  for
the first  time the  choice  of how  many  children  to  bear.  In a high
mortality,  traditional  agricultural  environment,  a risk-averse  family  must
produce  children  almost  continually  during  the  reproductive  years  to
guarantee  an adequate  number  of surviving  children  (particularly  if gender
is an issue  to  parents)  to provide  farm  labor  and security  in old  age.  As
infant  mortality  drops,  the  probability  that investments  in higher  quality
18children  will be lost  through  death  also  falls,  allowing  the  price  of
children  to  begin rising. The lag  in  a response  by parents  to these
changes  may be several  years,  but it  happens.
More education  for  women  delays  marriage,  increases  the
likelihood  that  contraceptives  will  be used (and  used effectively),  boosts
the  probability  that  babies  will  survive  and  be healthy,  raises  female
labor  force  participation  (hence  other  economic  opportunities  for  women),
helps  women to gain  more control  over  the  decisions  that  affect  fertility,
and endows  them  with the  ability  and interest  in purchasing  more  education
for  their  own children. Each of these  effects  tends  to decrease  fertility.
More education  for  children  raises  their  cost for  parents  and
also increases  the  quality  of surviving  children. This is true  whether
parents  pay directly  for  schooling  or if it is provided  free  by the  state.
The household  in the  latter  case  loses  economic  services  otherwise  provided
by children. The  direct  costs  of  education,  which  are in  practice
substantial  in developing  country  households  even if  education  is  provided
b  the state,  are  multiplied  by the  number  of children,  so the  cost (of
education  or quality)  to  a family  rises  in a multiplicative,  not additive
fashion,  as more children  are  born.  Education  costs  alone  can  create  very
large  incentives  for  poorer  parents  to reduce  the  number  of children  that
they  raise.
Availability  of family  planning  services  of reasonable  quality
lowers  the  cost of fertility  control,  making  such  control  easier  all  other
things  the same.  Appending  a family  planning  program  to  a social  welfare
system  that  delivers  few if  any  health  or education  services  to the  poor is
unlikely  to produce  meaningful  results  once  the "unwanted  births"  are
eliminated. However,  a combination  of family  planning  services  with
19effective  health  and  education  services  has  been shown  to be more
successful  in reducing  fertility  than  providing  only the  former  or the
latter (Wheeler  1985).
The implication  is obvious. Health  and education  programs
targeted  to the  poor in  developing  countries  are one  way to reduce
fertility. Complementing  these  with targeted  family  services  assures  that
the  poor can translate  reduced  demand  for  large  families  irto  fewer  births.
The total  effect  will exceed  the  sum  of the  individual  effects  because  of
known  complementarities  among  the  three  services. A package  of services  is
an effective  and  eminently  sensible  method  to compensate  poor familie:3  in  a
way that results  in lower  fertility.
In the  same  spirit,  family  planning  programs  themselves  could
be reconstituted  to accent  their  welfare-enhancing  aspects. A family
planning  program  designed  to enhance  the  welfare  of the  poor client  would
be part of a set  of services  to improve  the  mother's  health,  the  safety  of
the  birth  process,  and the  health  of  her  children. Nutrition  supplements
would  almost  certainly  be provided  to  poorer  women (and  their  babies),  who
are the  main targets  of such  programs. Helping  mothers  to space  or delay
births  would  be integrated  with  these  other  services. Contrast  this
approach  with one,  until  recently  common  in South  Asia, in  which  a family
planning  worker's  success  was  measured  by increases  in the  number  of
sterilizations  performed,  new  acceptors  recruited,  or contraceptives
distributed. Such  a worker  had  every  incentive  to avoid  pregnant  women,
for  example,  who would  be a prime  target  of a welfare-enhancing  program.
Broader  Contrace2tive  Choice
Probably  the  most  pressing  issue  in the  design  of family
planning  systems  from  a  welfare  standpoint  is the  narrow  focus  on
20sterilizations  of  somft  programs,  particularly  in  South  Asia.  This  narrow
focus  is  the  result  of  the  long  period  during  which  family  planning
programs  in  South  Asia  were  designed  with  demographic  targets  in  mind  --
and  thus  without  a  clear  welfare  objective.
In  India,  for  example,  contraceptive  prevalence  from  all
methods  was  35  percent  in 1980,  compared  to  14  percent  in  1970.  However,
almost  the  entire  increase  in  prevalence  was  due  to  sterilizations,
condoms,  and  traditional  methods.  Among 60  percent  of  contracepting
couples,  at  least  one  partner  was  sterilized.  Less  than  5  percent  used
IUDs  or  birth  control  pills,  and  the  remaining  couples  used  less  effective
methods.  In  fact,  the  proportion  of  users  of  IUDs  and  pills  methods  fell
over  the  decade.
Older  women at  the  end  of  their  childbearing  years  are  the
principal  demanders  of  sterilizations;  consequently,  the  impact  on
fertility  of  permanent  methods,  although  initially  large,  may  be  small  over
the  long  run  for  the  investment  required.  For  India  in  1980,  38  percent  of
married  women between  the  ages  of  35  and  39  were  sterilized,  compared  to
4.5  percent  of  those  between  20  and  24,  and  18  percent  of  those  between
ages  25  and  29.  In  contrast,  the  highest  frequency  of  condom  and  pill  use
was  among  the  two  younger  groups,  although  in  absolute  terms  it  was
minuscule  even  among  them  --  less  than  2  percent.  About  40  percent  of
women with  4  children  were  sterilized,  compared  to  16  percent  with  1  child,
another  indicator  that  women are  careful  to  use  permanent  methods  late  in
their  reproductive  lives.  (Stout  1989).
Without  good  access  to  temporary  methods,  younger  women  cannot
benefit  from  the  possibility  of  planning  the  timing  as  well  as  the  number
of  births,  nor  from  the  larger  welfare  benefits  associated  with  reduced
21uncertainty  in their  own lives. A program  oriented  to  younger  women  would
also deliver  services  valuable  to  older  women,  but  the  converse  of that
statement  is less  likely  to be true.
Women's  Welfare  and the  Timina  of Births
As the  above  illustrates,  a population  program  aimed  at welfare
enhancement  as well as fertility  reduction  is  more likely  to be shaped  by
the  particular  needs  of important  groups  of clients. The  most obvious  such
group  is  women.
Access  to effective  fertility  control  methods,  because  it
provides  women  with reliable  control  over their  reproductive  lives,  allows
them to  make reproduction  predictable  and thus  to approach  economic  life
with fewer  random  fertility  shocks  and  on a  more level  playing  field  with
men.  Birdsall  and  Chester (1987)  argue,  for  example,  that  the  relatively
low  status  of women  in Japan  compared  to women  in  other  developed  countries
is  partially  a consequence  of their  heavy  dependence  on condoms  and
abortion  to control  fertility. The reason  for  their  low  status  is not high
fertility  itself  --  Japan's  fertility  level  is  among  the  lowest  in the
world --  but the  probability  of unplanned  pregnancies,  which is  higher  for
Japanese  women  than  for their  counterparts  in  other  similar  countries  who
use  more reliable  means  of control. Birdsall  and  Chester  argue that  family
planning  programs,  even  as they  may  be dependent  for  success  on women's
status,  are  also likely  to enhance  women's  status  substantially.
This  positive  and  independent  effect  of family  planning  on the
welfare  of women,  is  not only,  however,  simply  a rationale  for offering
family  planning  programs. It is also the  basis  for  a program  strategy  that
has a particular  orientation  to the  contzol  of timing  of births.  Such an
orientation  implies  a contraceptive  mix  aimed  less  at meeting  state targets
22for number  of births  averted  and  more at  a mix that  increases  a  woman's
ability  to manage  the  number  and frequency  of births  she  experiences.
(Moreover,  it is  not obvious  that  the  former  strategy  would  result  in fewer
births  than the  lattar. A program  aimed  at helping  women  space  births  or
delay  the first  birth  can  reach  any  population  growth  targets  planned;  more
important,  it is  much  more likely  to  contribute  to a revolutionary  change
in society's  views  of the  entire  reproduction  process,  and in the  long  run,
therefore,  to major  fertility  decline.)
Section  rV.  Conclusion
We have tried  to sugge  t that  no  matter  what the  source  of
one's interest  in  population  programs,  the  only reasonable  way to  view them
is as activities  in which  one segment  of society  (the  rich)  is  offering
another  segment (the  poor)  compensation  in  order  to elicit  a change  in
behavior. Where  there  are  true  externalities  (figure  1),  the  rich  may also
end  up as well  or better  off  even  in income  terms  than they  were  because
everyone  can  ben.fit  from  the  overall  efficiency  gain.  Where  there  are not
true externalities  (figure  2),  the  poor  are  made  better  off  in a real
income  sense  as the  rich  gain  in  utility  terms  by financing  the  necessary
social  programs. Any other  approach  is,  by definition,  either  coercive  or
ultimately  ineffective. There  is consequently  a fundamental  logic  to
treating  population  programs  as at one  and the  same time  client-oriented
social  services  and  poverty  programs.
Underlying  this  approach  is the  idea that  fertility  is
endogenous,  a rational  decision  by households  given  their  opportunities  and
constraints. In order  to elicit  changes  in  behavior  among  the  poor (whose
23fertility  tends  to  be higher  than  that  of the  rich),  the  poor  must be
treated  as clients,  and  must be given  reason  to change.
The  basic  principle  that  parents  who want more  children  mtst be
compensated  not to  have them  is  at the  core  of welfare  economics. It
matters  little  whether  the  rationale  for  a  population  program  is one  of
externalities,  of unwanted  fertility,  or of improving  income  distribution.
Such programs  in the  end  must involve  compensation,  either  directly  or
indirectly. Well designed  programs,  by our  reckoning,  are those  that
incorporate  the  criterion  of keeping  the  poor at least  as well  off in their
own eyes after  they  choose  to  have  fewer  children.
We should  carefully  rethink  whether  the level  of resources
devoted  to these  programs  is adequate  and  whether  the  programs  themselves
are designed  with the  client's  welfare  in mind.  The critical  question  for
any  population  program  or policy  when  welfare  concerns  are  brought  to the
forefront  is:  Will the  program  help  the  poor to improve  their  lives  after
they  have smaller  families?
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